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Abstract  
The financial crisis which erupted in 2007-8 has illustrated the disruptive effects of 
procyclicality. The phenomenon of procyclicality refers to the mutually reinforcing 
interactions between the financial system and the real economy that tend to amplify 
business cycle fluctuations. In this study, we empirically investigate the sensitivity of 
the CAMELS ratings system, which is used by the U.S. authorities to monitor the 
conditions in the banking market, to the fluctuations of the economic cycle. Our 
results suggest that the overall state of the U.S. economy and bank regulatory ratings 
are positively linked to each other: CAMELS increase during economic upturns and 
decrease during downturns. This is to say that the performance and risk-taking 
behaviour of banks is rated higher when the conditions in the economy are favourable 
and lower when the economic environment is weak. Along these lines, we document a 
positive relationship between CAMELS and the conditions in financial markets. This 
very important and rather unknown source of procyclicality should be taken into 
serious consideration by authorities. 
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1. Introduction 
The concern about procyclicality has been revived after the eruption of the global financial crisis 
in 2007-8. In broad terms, procyclicality is related to the mutually reinforcing interactions 
between the financial system and the real economy that tend to amplify business cycle 
fluctuations. These fluctuations can cause or exacerbate turbulences in the financial system and 
this explains why supervisory and regulatory authorities are so much concerned in mitigating the 
degree of procyclicality of the system. 
     The key sources of procyclicality in the financial sector are related to the distortions in 
incentives. To provide an example, financial contracts that establish a direct link between asset 
valuations and funding do not capture the conflicts of interest between lenders and borrowers. A 
second example of incentives’ distortions involves actions by individual agents that may be 
rational from the agents’ perspective, but may result in unfavourable outcomes for the system as 
a whole. This happens when, e.g., bank managers take excessive risk with the purpose to 
increase the short-term profits of their banks and also their bonuses. Excessive risk, however, has 
been proved to be harmful for the stability of the financial system and detrimental for the entire 
economy in the medium to long-run.   
     The procyclical tendency of the financial systems worldwide towards boom-bust cycles goes 
back to the work of Minsky (1977). Nevertheless, the impact of procyclicality on the smooth 
functioning of the economic and financial activities had only recently confirmed in the relevant 
empirical literature. Indeed, bank capital adequacy requirements, risk and profit measurements, 
and credit supply have all been lately found to be amongst the fundamental factors which foster 
the positive feedback mechanisms between the financial and the real sectors of the economy. 
Moreover, some recent studies have provided strong support to the view that the lending 
behaviour of banks is significantly affected by business cycle waves. Along the same lines, bank 
leverage has been also lately found to follow a procyclical pattern.  
     Even though the banking literature on procyclicality has sufficiently advanced over the last 
decade or so, little attention has been paid on the ratings of banking institutions and how these 
are linked to the phenomenon of procyclicality. In this paper, we make an effort to fill this 
literature gap by examining the sensitivity of the CAMELS ratings system to the fluctuations of 
economic cycle. The Uniform Financial Rating System, informally known as CAMELS ratings 
system, is one of the most important tools that the U.S. regulatory authorities use to assess the 
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overall health of individual banking institutions and to monitor the conditions in the banking 
market. In fact, regulators resort to CAMELS every 12 to 18 months to conduct on-site 
examinations of bank safety and soundness. Our results suggest that the overall state of the U.S. 
economy and bank regulatory ratings are positively linked to each other: CAMELS increase 
during economic upturns and decrease during downturns. This is to say that the performance and 
risk-taking behaviour of banks is rated higher when the conditions in the economy are favourable 
and lower when the economic environment is weak. Along these lines, we document a positive 
relationship between CAMELS and the conditions in financial markets. 
     The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
presents the data set, the variables, and the econometric model which we employ in our analysis; 
the empirical results are discussed in this Section. Section 4 is devoted to robustness checks, 
whereas Section 5 provides a brief summary of our main findings and offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Literature review 
Early research on procyclicality has been mainly focused on the operation of bank capital buffers 
in the context of Basel I (Rime, 2001; Ayuso et al., 2004; Estrella, 2004; Lindquist, 2004; and 
Jokopii and Milne, 2006 among others). Though the majority of these studies focus on different 
banking markets and rely on various econometric techniques, they all provide strong empirical 
evidence that the Basel I capital buffers exhibit significant cyclical patterns in the sense that 
buffers tend to increase during economic downturns and decrease during upturns. Several other 
studies have evaluated the cyclicality character of capital charges under Basel II before its 
implementation by employing numerical simulations on hypothetical or real world portfolios. 
For example, Kashyap and Stein (2004) conduct a simulation exercise to show that the increase 
in capital charges under Basel II for the average virtual portfolio of borrowers lies in the range of 
30% to 45%. In a similar vein, Jokivuolle and Peura (2004) and Zicchino (2005) find that capital 
buffers dampen the cyclical effects of Basel II. Repullo and Suarez (2013) construct a dynamic 
general equilibrium model that highlights the cyclical behaviour of the Basel II capital buffers. 
They show that the probabilities of bank failures are much lower under the Basel II regime than 
under Basel I or in a situation with no capital requirements. This is to say, the side effects of 
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Basel II are basically consist of a pay-off in terms of the long-term solvency of banking 
organisations. 
After the onset of the late 2000s crisis, the relevant literature has documented that during 
boom phases where the financial sector rises and economy grows, banks are very optimistic 
regarding near future economic trends (i.e., a general euphoria prevails in the economy) thus 
utilising downward biased information sets to evaluate risk. As a consequence, risk tends to be 
underestimated making the (risk-based) Basel II capital requirements to shrink in the expansion 
phase of the business cycle when risk is measured to be low. At the same time, banks expand 
their lending activity which, in turn, inflates asset prices. Collateral values also rise justifying 
even more lending and this perpetuates the endogenous cycle. The opposite with what we 
describe above occurs in economic downturns like in the period that followed the years 2007-8. 
On the one hand, banks are particularly fragile in this phase of the business cycle which renders 
them very cautious in extending credit, whereas on the other hand market expectations on future 
economic activity and future economic fundamentals are very low. Hence, in such periods, risk 
is measured to be high feeding further the inclination of financial institutions to strengthen their 
capital base by holding capital well in excess of the minimum requirements. The increase in 
capital requirements during downswings reduces credit availability and asset prices and is highly 
likely to result in a credit crunch that deteriorates the already adverse economic conditions. 
To move further, Gordy and Howells (2006) examine the phenomenon of procyclicality by 
focusing on the Third Pillar of Basel II, which concerns market discipline via public disclosure 
practices. Their study investigates whether and to what extent the enforcement of banks to 
disclose detailed information on their risk profile and capital adequacy to the public has a 
procyclical impact on banks’ lending activity. Their simulation-based empirical approach 
indicates that the extent of cyclicality in capital requirements depends largely on how market 
discipline makes banks to vary their fresh loans according to macroeconomic conditions. By the 
same token, Peek et al. (2003) and Lown and Morgan (2006) show that the supply of credit 
increases during cycle upturns and shrinks in contraction phases. 
The debate over the procyclicality of the financial system has also turned to focus on the 
impact that the loan loss provisioning system of banking institutions has on credit cycles. There 
are two different aspects for such kind of analysis depending on how Loan Loss Provisions 
(LLPs) are treated. On the one hand, we have the so-called ‘risk-management hypothesis’ that 
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emphasises the interest of regulatory and supervisory authorities to reduce procyclicality of both 
LLPs and bank capital. Risk management links provisioning rules to the capital requirements 
through the coverage of credit risk. Specifically, expected future credit losses are covered by 
loan loss reserves whereas unexpected losses are covered by capital reserves. The component of 
LLPs which covers expected losses is called non-discretionary. There is, however, one more 
component, the discretionary component, which is linked to the ‘capital management hypothesis’ 
according to which provisions are used for bank management purposes like income smoothing, 
capital management, or for the signaling of bank financial strength to investors and their 
counterparts. 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) use a sample of 184 European banks over the period 1992-2004 
to examine how LLPs affect the procyclicality of the financial system by differentiating the 
discretionary component of LLPs from the non-discretionary component. They conclude that the 
former one has no considerable impact on credit cycles, in contrast to the latter one which 
amplifies system’s procyclicality. In more details, their results show that banks are capable of 
identifying only a small number of problem loans in periods of economic upsurges, whereas 
provisions for bad loans increase by a lot when economy slows down. The procyclical effect of 
the non-discretionary component of LLPs is also reported in the studies of Laeven and Majnoni 
(2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and, more recently, in that of Fonseca and Gonzalez 
(2008). 
Albertazzi and Cambacorta (2009) empirically examine the relationship between bank 
profitability and business cycle fluctuations focusing on a set of 10 industrialised economies.  
Profits are calculated using interest and non-interest income together with operating expenses, 
and LLPs. Their findings suggest that interest income and provisions are strongly affected by 
changes in economic growth in contrast to noninterest income which remains rather unaltered. 
Since banks rely more and more on modern financial products that produce noninterest income, 
they argue that bank profits have turned to be less procyclical nowadays.  
Another aspect of procyclicality is the one related to the leverage of financial institutions. 
Adrian and Shin (2010) investigate the leverage behaviour of the five largest US investment 
banks prior to the crisis finding strong evidence of procyclicality. They show that in the 
economic upsurge that preceded the crisis, the market value of assets moved upwards and 
investment banks exploited this trend to increase their leverage. Such increase was attained 
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mainly through the increase in overnight inexpensive repurchase agreements. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the procyclicality of leverage can be more pronounced for non-depository 
institutions like investment banks whose assets and liabilities are more exposed to market 
conditions, the reliance of commercial banks on short-term funding through securitised activities 
made the typical retail depository institutions also prone to procyclicality. In fact, IMF World 
Economic Outlook (2008) provides strong evidence of procyclical leverage by commercial banks 
in arm’s-length financial systems, i.e., systems where intermediation relies more on financial 
markets and not so much on traditional bank-based activities.  
Procyclicality can also be traced in the credit rating scores assigned to financial institutions by 
the international rating agencies. Indeed, Pagratis and Stringa (2009) provide significant 
evidence of a positive relationship between bank ratings and economic activity. Following the 
relevant corporate finance literature (see, e.g., Amato and Furfine, 2004) and using a sample of 
293 banks from 33 countries over the period 1999-2006, they show that senior unsecured ratings 
assigned to banks by Moody’s tend to be lower in economic slowdowns and higher in economic 
upturns. 
 
3. Empirical analysis  
3.1. Data set 
We focus on U.S. commercial and savings banking institutions that file a Report on Condition 
and Income (also known as Call Report). Thrifts -i.e., savings and loans associations- are 
excluded from our empirical analysis because they file a different report (the Thrift Financial 
Report).1 Data are of quarterly frequency and extend from the beginning of 2002 (2002q1) to the 
end of 2015 (2015q4) thus capturing both the pre- and the post-crisis periods. Since our focus is 
on the global financial crisis, we do not examine the years prior to 2002 because the two 
international financial crises which erupted in East Asia and in Russia towards the end of the 
’90s combined with the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis in late 1998 and the dot-
com bubble crisis of the early 2000s all had a considerable destabilising impact on the operation 
of international financial markets and on the U.S. banking system. 
                                                 
1 With the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and the establishment of the Office of Thrift Supervision in July 
2011, all thrifts were required to file and submit a Call Report from March 2012. 
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     We begin with 8,905 active commercial and savings banking institutions that filed a Call 
Report in 2002q1. Due to failures, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that took place during the 
sample period, the total number of active banks was reduced to 6,791 in 2015q4. After checking 
the data for reporting errors and other inconsistencies, we end up with a total of 6,509 banks. 
 
3.2. The CAMEL ratings system 
The Uniform Financial Rating System, informally known as CAMEL, was introduced by the 
U.S. regulators in November 1979 to conduct on-site examinations of bank safety and 
soundness. CAMEL is a vector of five different measures capturing Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management expertise, Earnings strength, and Liquidity. In 1996, CAMEL evolved into 
CAMELS, with the addition of a sixth component (‘S’) that summarises the Sensitivity to market 
risk. Under the CAMELS rating system, banking firms are rated from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). 
Banks with a composite rating of 4 or 5 are considered problem banks. Banks with ratings of 1 or 
2 are considered to present few, if any, supervisory concerns, while banks with ratings of 3, 4, or 
5 present moderate to extreme degrees of supervisory concern. 
     The dependent variable in our model is denoted by CAMELS and is a composite vector of 
Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management expertise, Earnings strength, Liquidity, and 
Sensitivity to market risk. We follow the relevant literature (see, e.g., Lane et al, 1986; Cole and 
Gunther, 1995; Stojanovic et al., 2008; Ioannidis et al., 2010; Klomp and de Haan, 2012) to 
construct a vector of bank performance and risk-taking measures, which is designed to resemble 
the original CAMELS components. We use the standard equity-to-assets ratio as an indicator of 
bank capital strength (CAP1); asset quality is measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans and leases (ASSETQLT1); the quality of bank management is measured by managerial 
efficiency as calculated by the input-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis (MNGEXP1);2 the 
return on assets expressed as the ratio of total net income (given by the difference between total 
interest plus non-interest income and total interest plus non-interest expense) to total assets is 
applied as a measure of earnings strength (EARN1); the ratio of cash and balances due from 
depository institutions to total deposits reflects the degree of bank liquidity (LQDT1); lastly, 
sensitivity to market risk (SENSRISK1) is proxied by the change in the slope of the yield curve 
                                                 
2 The calculation of MNGEXP1 is described in Appendix B.  
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(given by the change in the quarterly difference between the 10-year U.S. T-bill rate and the 3-
month U.S. T-bill rate) divided by total earning assets. 
     To develop all the aforementioned ratios, we use bank balance sheet data of quarterly 
frequency which are collected from Call Reports as found in the website of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago and that of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 
Central Data Repository's Public Data Distribution. Interest rates and yields are collected from 
the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Department of the Treasury and are also of quarterly 
frequency. All variables and the relevant data sources are summarised in Appendix A. 
 
3.3. The econometric model 
The model we employ in our empirical analysis relies on a data set which, as earlier described, 
consists of the universe of the U.S. commercial and savings banks and extends from 2002q1 to 
2015q4, where q=2002q1, 2002q2,…, 2015q4. Our model is as follows:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑡𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑡𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑡𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑡𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + +𝛽5,𝑡𝑀𝑅𝐾𝐿𝑄𝐷𝑇𝑡 
+𝛽6,𝑡𝑀𝑅𝐾𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾1,𝑖𝑡𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2,𝑖𝑡𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3,𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4,𝑖𝑡𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑂𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑡 +
                        +𝛾5,𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + +𝛾6,𝑖𝑡𝐵𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾7,𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 + +𝛾8,𝑡𝐶𝑅1𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                         (1) 
 
where i=1, 2,…, N (N=6,509) sample banks, and t=1, 2,…, T (T=56) quarters. We measure the 
main economic fundamentals with the following three variables: the GDP output gap (GDP) as 
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce; the 
change in the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) to control for variations in the level of prices; 
and the unemployment rate (UNEM). Both inflation and unemployment data are obtained from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. We also account for the financial 
state variables that are expected to affect bank ratings as captured by CAMELS. We measure 
market return volatility with the Implied Volatility Index (VIX) obtained from the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Market, the market liquidity risk (MRKLQDT) given by the quarterly 
difference between the 3-month LIBOR rate and the 3-month U.S. T-bill rate, and the market 
credit risk (MRKCREDIT) measured by the quarterly change in the credit spread between the 10-
year BAA-rated bonds and the 10-year U.S. T-bill rate. The latter two variables are constructed 
based on data from the Federal Reserve Board, GFDatabase, and Moody’s.  
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     Turning to the control variables of our model, we introduce bank size (SIZE) as the logarithm 
of the book value of total assets. Moreover, a number of banks played the role of acquirers in the 
M&A deals that took place during the examined period but, mainly, after the outbreak of the 
crisis. We, therefore, resort to the relevant files of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago to 
investigate whether a bank has been involved in a M&A transaction as an acquirer to control for 
the effect on our dependent variable.3 Towards this, we introduce a dummy variable in our model 
(MA), which is equal to unity when the acquirer bank i is involved in a M&A transaction and 
remains equal to one until the end of our data period. For example, if an acquisition occurred on 
April 15 2008 then this transaction is recorded in the second quarter of 2008, meaning that the 
binary variable MA takes the value of one in 2008q2 and remains as such for all the subsequent 
quarters. 
     We follow Jordan et al. (2011) and Berger and Roman (2015) and introduce a dummy 
indicator (MSA) which is equal to one if a bank is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area -an 
integrated economic and social unit with a recognised large population nucleus- and zero 
otherwise. The geographical location of each sample bank is identified through Call Reports; 
detailed data for the Metropolitan Statistical Areas are taken from the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget. 
     It is well-documented in the banking literature that the behaviour and performance of the 
newly chartered banks substantially differ from those of banks in operation over a relatively long 
period of time. More specifically, once a bank first enters the market, its financial performance 
tends to lag by a considerable margin compared to that of the existing banking firms.4 That said, 
we account for the so-called de novo banks, defined as banks less than five years old by 
including a dummy (DENOVO) in our model. 
     We follow Berger and Roman (2015) and construct an indicator variable (PUBLIC) that 
captures if a bank is listed on the stock exchange. Since the decision-making units we examine 
are not holding companies, the subsidiaries of publicly traded BHCs are considered to be public. 
Banks with private placements of shares with a Committee on Uniform Securities Identification 
Procedures (CUSIP) number, banks without a stock exchange listing, and banks whose bank 
                                                 
3 The relevant data can be found in the following web page: https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-
institution-reports/merger-data  
4 See, e.g., DeYoung and Hasan (1998), and DeYoung (2003) for a thorough analysis on the operational behaviour 
of de novo banks. 
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holding company is not listed at the stock exchange are treated as non-public. The data on 
trading and listing are derived from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
Lastly, a dummy variable (BHC) showing whether a sample bank is a subsidiary of a BHC is 
also considered in our empirical analysis as in Jordan et al. (2011) and Berger and Roman 
(2015). 
     Moreover, we measure the degree of market concentration with the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) using bank total deposits as the input variable. HHI is calculated as the sum of 
squares of the market share of each bank included in our sample: 
 
      𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 = ∑ (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑖𝑞
2𝑛
𝑖=1            (2) 
 
Eq. (2) relies on the market share of bank i at quarter q where n is the total number of banks in 
the examined market. The index ranges from 0 to 10,000, where zero reveals a market with an 
infinite number of banks and 10,000 shows a market with just a single banking firm. HHI is a 
static measure in the sense that it estimates market concentration at some particular point in time 
q. 
     We further introduce a crisis dummy (CR1) to capture the impact of crisis on the operation of 
the banking firms. We consider the third quarter of 2007 (2007q3) to be the starting point of the 
crisis. Indeed, that was the time when the TED spread (the difference between the yield on the 
three-month London Interbank Offered Rate -i.e., LIBOR- and the yield on three-month U.S. 
Treasury bills) which is one of the most widely-used indicators of credit risk, widened to almost 
200 basis points relative to a historically stable range of 10-50 basis points.5 All variables we 
employ in eq. 1and the sources utilised to construct them are summarised in Appendix A. 
 
3.4. Discussion of the empirical results  
The regression results of our baseline analysis are presented in the Table 1 that follows.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Other recent studies -like that of Cornett et al. (2011)- also use the third quarter of 2007 as the starting point of the 
crisis. 
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                                                   Table 1 
Estimation results: Baseline model 
Variable Coeff. value t-stat 
GDP  0.17  3.35*** 
CPI  0.19  2.98*** 
UNEM -0.11 -2.65*** 
VIX -0.16 -4.15*** 
MRKLQDT -0.19     -2.19** 
MRKCREDIT -0.09      -2.01** 
SIZE         0.38        2.21** 
MA          0.22       2.38** 
MSA          0.04       1.99** 
DENOVO         -0.15      -1.76* 
PUBLIC          0.21       2.30** 
BHC          0.07       1.40 
HHI         -0.83 -3.18*** 
CR1         -1.28 -3.61*** 
𝑅2 0.26  
This table presents the estimation results of the baseline 
regression model (Eq. 1). The dependent variable is 
denoted by CAMELS and is a composite vector of capital 
strength (CAP1), asset quality (ASSETQLT1), quality of 
management (MNGEXP1), earnings strength (EARN1), 
degree of liquidity (LQDT1), and sensitivity to market risk 
(SENSRISK1). The key dependent variables are the GDP 
output gap (GDP), the inflation rate (CPI), the 
unemployment rate (UNEM), market return volatility (VIX), 
market liquidity risk (MRKLQDT), and the market credit 
risk (MRKCREDIT). The set of control variables includes 
bank size groups (small, medium, large, and extra-large 
12 
 
banks), a dummy for acquirer banks in M&A transactions 
(MA), a dummy showing whether a bank is located in a 
MSA or in a rural county (MSA), a dummy for newly-
chartered banks (DENOVO); a dummy variable for banks 
which are listed on the stock exchange (PUBLIC), a 
dummy indicating whether a bank is a subsidiary of a BHC 
(BHC), banking market concentration (HHI), and a dummy 
variable that captures the crisis period (CR1). All 
observations are based on quarter observations, and cover 
the entire data period, which extends from 2002q1 to 
2015q4. The description of each variable and the relevant 
data sources are included in Appendix A.  
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of 
significance respectively for a two-tailed distribution 
 
     Our results reveal the large extent to which bank regulatory ratings depend on business cycle 
fluctuations: the coefficient of GDP growth as well as that of inflation turn out to be significantly 
positive at the 1% level, while the coefficient of unemployment is significantly negative also at 
the 1%. This implies that CAMELS increase during cyclical upturns and decrease during 
downturns. The effects of economic conditions we document here are in line with the effects 
obtained from our baseline regression analysis if financial conditions are considered. Lower 
market volatility (VIX), lower liquidity market risk (MRKLQDT), and lower market credit risk 
(MRKCREDIT) which are all evidence of stable financial conditions observed during economic 
upturns are negatively related with bank ratings.  
     As regards bank size, this is positively linked to CAMELS revealing that larger banks are 
rated higher by regulators. When a bank is involved as an acquirer in a M&A transaction (MA), 
this has a positive and significant impact on its regulatory rating. Further, if a sample bank is 
located in an MSA, then it is more likely to obtain a higher rating by regulatory authorities. As 
expected, newly-chartered banks (DENOVO) are more likely to receive a lower rating, whereas 
banks which are publically traded (PUBLIC) are linked to higher ratings. On the other hand, 
BHC is not found to be significantly related with CAMELS. To continue, market concentration 
(HHI) has a negative positive impact on CAMELS, implying that banks which operate under a 
less concentrated (more competitive) market structure are expected to receive a higher rating. 
Lastly, the impact of the global financial crisis on bank ratings is negative and highly significant. 
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4. Robustness analysis 
We now move to examine the sensitivity of our baseline regression results. To this end, we use a 
set of alternative variables to construct CAMELS ratings. The main reason of doing so is 
because the components of CAMELS are kept confidential from regulators and, hence, it is 
crucial to test the sensitivity of our baseline regression results to a set of alternative CAMELS 
variables. Capital adequacy is measured by the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital to total risk-
weighted assets (CAP2); asset quality is captured by the restructured and outstanding balances of 
loans and lease financing receivables that the bank has placed in nonaccrual status divided by 
total loans and leases (ASSETQLT2); management expertise is proxied by the total operating 
income calculated by the sum of interest income and non-interest income as a fraction of the 
total earning assets (MNGEXP2) which is a typical measure of operating efficiency in the 
banking literature (see, e.g., Lane et al., 1986); the return on equity given by the ratio of total net 
income to total equity capital is utilised to measure banks’ earnings (EARN2); the ratio of federal 
funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase to total assets (LQDT2) is 
employed to measure the degree of liquidity of the sample banking firms; and the sensitivity to 
market risk (SENSRISK2) is proxied by the market interest rate risk defined as the quarterly 
standard deviation of the day-to-day 3-month U.S. T-bill rate divided by total earning assets. All 
variables employed in the robustness analysis as well as the sources used to construct these 
variables are summarised in Appendix A.   
     We rerun our baseline model (eq. 1) and we obtain the results which are reported in Table 2 
and which corroborate our conclusions reached in our baseline analysis. Indeed, we document a 
statistically significant relationship between CAMELS and the overall state of the U.S. economy. 
In specific, the coefficients of GDP and CPI are significantly positive at the 1% level, while that 
of UNEM is found to be significantly negative at the 1%, implying that the performance of banks 
is rated higher when economic conditions are favourable, and lower when the economic 
environment is weak. Along the same lines, favourable (adverse) financial conditions have a 
positive (negative) impact on CAMELS.  
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                                                   Table 2 
Estimation results: Robustness model 
Variable Coeff. value t-stat 
GDP  0.20  3.18*** 
CPI  0.21  3.06*** 
UNEM -0.12 -2.72*** 
VIX -0.18 -4.01*** 
MRKLQDT -0.23     -2.38** 
MRKCREDIT -0.11      -1.97** 
SIZE         0.45        2.37** 
MA          0.26       2.50** 
MSA          0.05       2.08** 
DENOVO         -0.20      -1.88* 
PUBLIC          0.17       2.41** 
BHC          0.09       1.27 
HHI         -0.71 -3.58*** 
CR1         -1.13 -3.90*** 
   
𝑅2 0.28  
This table presents the estimation results of the baseline 
regression model (Eq. 1). The dependent variable is 
denoted by CAMELS and is a composite vector of capital 
strength (CAP2), asset quality (ASSETQLT2), quality of 
management (MNGEXP2), earnings strength (EARN2), 
degree of liquidity (LQDT2), and sensitivity to market risk 
(SENSRISK2). The key dependent variables are the GDP 
output gap (GDP), the inflation rate (CPI), the 
unemployment rate (UNEM), market return volatility (VIX), 
market liquidity risk (MRKLQDT), and the market credit 
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risk (MRKCREDIT). The set of control variables includes 
bank size groups (small, medium, large, and extra-large 
banks), a dummy for acquirer banks in M&A transactions 
(MA), a dummy showing whether a bank is located in a 
MSA or in a rural county (MSA), a dummy for newly-
chartered banks (DENOVO); a dummy variable for banks 
which are listed on the stock exchange (PUBLIC), a 
dummy indicating whether a bank is a subsidiary of a BHC 
(BHC), banking market concentration (HHI), and a dummy 
variable that captures the crisis period (CR1). All 
observations are based on quarter observations, and cover 
the entire data period, which extends from 2002q1 to 
2015q4. The description of each variable and the relevant 
data sources are included in Appendix A. 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of 
significance respectively for a two-tailed distribution 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The financial crisis which erupted in 2007-8 has illustrated the disruptive effects of 
procyclicality, which refers to the amplification of the effects of the business cycle, and of the 
risk that can build up when financial institutions acting in an individually imprudent manner 
collectively create systemic problems. There is now broad consensus among regulators and 
supervisors that the microprudential regulatory framework needs to be complemented by 
macroprudential principles that can smooth the effects of the credit cycle. This has led to 
proposals for countercyclical capital requirements and loan loss provisions that would be higher 
in good times and lower in bad times. 
     One very important aspect which should also be seriously considered from authorities is the 
procyclicality of performance ratings system of banking institutions, which is the main topic of 
analysis of the current study. Indeed, in this study, we focus on the ratings of the U.S. banking 
institutions and how these are linked to the phenomenon of procyclicality. Towards this, we 
empirically investigate the sensitivity of CAMELS ratings system, which is used by the U.S. 
authorities to monitor the conditions in the banking market, to the fluctuations of economic 
cycle. The results of our empirical analysis reveal that the overall state of the U.S. economy and 
CAMELS ratings largely depend on the course of the business cycle. More concretely, we find 
that CAMELS are lower during economic upturns and higher during economic downturns. This 
is to say that the performance and risk-taking behaviour of banks is rated higher when the 
conditions in the economy are favourable, and lower when the economic environment turns to be 
weak. 
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Appendix A: Variables and data sources 
The following table presents all variables that we use in the econometric analysis. The abbreviation of each variable and the source we use to collect the data 
are also reported. 
Variable  Abbreviation Definition Data source 
    
CAMELS components    
Capital adequacy 
CAP1 The ratio of book equity capital to total assets 
Call Reports  
CAP2 The ratio of regulatory (Tier 1) capital to total risk-weighted assets 
   
Asset quality 
ASSETQLT1 The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and leases  
ASSETQLT2 
The ratio of restructured and outstanding balances of loans and lease financing 
receivables that the bank has placed in nonaccrual status to total loans and leases 
   
Management expertise 
MNGEXP1 Managerial efficiency calculated using the input-oriented DEA model  
MNGEXP2 
The ratio of total operating income calculated as the sum of interest income and 
non-interest income to total earning assets 
   
Earnings strength 
EARN1 
The ratio of total net income given by the difference between total interest plus 
non-interest income and total interest plus non-interest expense to total assets 
EARN2 
The ratio of total net income given by the difference between total interest plus 
non-interest income and total interest plus non-interest expense to total equity 
capital 
   
Liquidity 
LQDT1 The ratio of cash and balances due from depository institutions to total deposits 
LQDT2 
The ratio of federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to 
repurchase to total assets 
Sensitivity to market risk SENSRISK1 
The change in the slope of the yield curve (given by the change in the quarterly 
difference between the 10-year U.S. T-bill rate and the 3-month U.S. T-bill rate) 
divided by total earning assets. 
Federal Reserve Board  
& 
U.S. Department of the 
Treasury 
  SENSRISK2 
Market interest rate risk (defined as the quarterly standard deviation of the day-
to-day 3-month U.S. T-bill rate) divided by total earning assets. 
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Managerial efficiency    
Total loans u1 The sum of commercial, construction, industrial, individual and real estate loans 
Call Reports 
Total deposits u2 
The sum of total transaction deposit accounts, non-transaction savings deposits, 
and total time deposits 
Other earning assets u3 
The sum of income-earned assets other than loans and the net deferred income 
taxes 
Total non-interest income u4 
The sum of income from fiduciary activities, service charges on deposit 
accounts, trading fees and income from foreign exchange transactions and from 
assets held in trading accounts, and other non-interest income 
Securitisation activity u5 
The value of the outstanding principal balance of loans, leases, and all relevant 
assets securitised and sold to other financial institutions with recourse or other 
credit enhancements divided by total assets 
Price of borrowed funds v1 The ratio of total interest expense to total deposits and other borrowed money 
Price of labour v2 The ratio of total salaries and benefits to the number of full-time employees 
Price of physical capital v3 
The ratio of expenses for premises and fixed assets to the dollar amount of 
premises and fixed assets 
Macroeconomic conditions    
Economic growth GDP GDP output gap 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, U.S. Department 
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of Commerce 
Inflation CPI The quarterly change in U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
U.S. Department of Labor Unemployment UNEM Unemployment rate 
Financial conditions    
Implied Volatility  VIX An index of market return volatility 
Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Market 
Market liquidity risk  MRKLQDT 
The quarterly difference between the 3-month LIBOR rate and  
the 3-month U.S. T-bill rate 
Federal Reserve Board  
& GFDatabase 
Market credit risk MRKCREDIT 
The quarterly change in the credit spread between the 10-year  
BAA-rated bonds and the 10-year U.S. T-bill rate 
Federal Reserve Board  
& Moody’s 
Control variables    
Bank size SIZE The book value of the logarithm of total assets Call Reports 
M&A transactions MA 
A dummy which is equal to unity if a bank is involved in a M&A transaction as 
an acquirer 
M&As database/Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Banking market concentration HHI The sum of squares of the market share of each sample bank Call Reports 
Bank location MSA 
A dummy showing whether a bank is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area 
or not 
Call Reports &  
U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget 
Newly-chartered bank DENOVO A dummy capturing the banks which are less than five years old Call Reports 
Listed bank PUBLIC A dummy which is equal to unity if bank i is listed on the exchange market 
Call Reports &  
Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
BHC affiliation BHC 
A dummy variable indicating whether a sample bank is a subsidiary of some 
BHC 
Call Reports 
Crisis dummy CR1 A dummy which is equal to 1 in 2007q3   
 
 
Appendix B 
To calculate managerial efficiency (MNGEXP1), we employ the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) model. DEA model can be computed either as input- or output-oriented. The input-
oriented DEA model shows by how much input quantities can be reduced without varying the 
output quantities produced. Similarly, the output-oriented DEA model assesses by how much 
output quantities can be proportionally increased without changing the input quantities used. 
Both output- and input-oriented models identify the same set of efficient/inefficient bank 
management. Nevertheless, even though the two approaches provide the same results under 
constant returns to scale, they give different values under variable returns to scale.6  
     We assume that for the N sample banks, there exist P inputs producing M outputs. Hence, 
each bank i uses a nonnegative vector of inputs denoted by 𝑣𝑖 = (𝑣1
𝑖 ,  𝑣2
𝑖 , … , 𝑣𝑝
𝑖 )𝑅+
𝑃 to produce 
a nonnegative vector of outputs, denoted by 𝑢𝑖 = (𝑢1
𝑖 ,  𝑢2
𝑖 , … , 𝑢𝑚
𝑖 )𝑅+
𝑀, where: i = 1, 2,…, N; p 
= 1, 2,…, P; and, m = 1, 2,…, M. The production technology, 𝐹 =  {(𝑢, 𝑣): 𝑣 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑢}, 
describes the set of feasible input-output vectors. The input sets of production technology, 
𝐿(𝑦) = {𝑣: (𝑢, 𝑣) ∊ 𝐹 }, describe the sets of input vectors which are feasible for each output 
vector. 
To measure the variable returns to scale managerial cost efficiency (MNGEXP1), we resort to 
the following input-oriented DEA model, where inputs are minimised and outputs are held at 
constant levels. Below, we sketch out the optimisation (minimisation) problem of bank1’s (i=1) 
cost inefficiency. Note that each bank i faces the same optimisation problem. 
 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11
∗ = min(−𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11),   𝑠. 𝑡.  ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑝 ≤ (𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11)(𝑣1𝑝)
𝑁
𝑖=1       (B1)                                        
                                 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑚 ≥ 𝑢1𝑚
𝑁
𝑖=1     (B2)         
               ∑ 𝜆𝑖 = 1
𝑁
𝑖=1           (B3) 
            𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0           (B4) 
 
In Eq. (B1- B4), 𝑣1𝑝and 𝑢1𝑚are the pth input and mth output for bank1, respectively; the 
convexity constraint, ∑ 𝜆𝑖 = 1
𝑁
𝑖=1 , accounts for variable returns to scale, where 𝜆𝑖  stands for the 
activity vector and denotes the intensity levels at which the total observations are conducted. 
                                                 
6 For a detailed discussion on the differences between input- and output-oriented DEA models, the interested reader 
can refer to Coelli et al. (2005). 
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This approach, through the convexity constraint, forms a convex hull of intersecting planes, 
since the frontier production plane is defined by combining a set of actual production planes. 
If 𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11
∗  is equal to unity, then the optimal efficiency score is achieved for bank1. This 
shows that the levels of inputs used cannot be proportionally improved given the output levels, 
indicating that bank1 lies upon the cost efficiency frontier. If, on the other hand, 𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11is 
less than unity the management of bank1 is considered to be inefficient. The more 𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11 
deviates from the unity, the less efficient the management of bank1 becomes.  
     An important concern in the estimation of MNGEXP1 is the definition of inputs and outputs. 
This essentially depends on the specific role that deposits play in the overall business model of 
banks. The relevant literature addresses this issue by traditionally referring to two approaches: 
the intermediation (or asset) approach, and the production (or value-added) approach.7 Under the 
former approach, financial firms are viewed as intermediaries which transform deposits and 
purchased funds into loans and other earning assets. That is, liabilities and physical factors are 
treated as inputs, while assets are treated as outputs. The production approach, on the other hand, 
regards financial institutions as producers of services for account holders, measuring output with 
the number of transactions or documents processed over a given period of time. Therefore, 
deposits are encompassed in the output and not in the input vector, which exclusively consists of 
physical entities. 
     Berger and Humphrey (1991) proposed a third approach, the modified production approach, 
which, contrary to the aforementioned traditional approaches, captures the dual role of bank 
deposits. This third approach is regarded as a combination of the intermediation and production 
approaches, as it enables the consideration of both the input and output characteristics of deposits 
in the cost function. More specifically, the price of deposits is considered to be an input, whereas 
the volume of deposits is accounted as an output. Under this specification, banks are assumed to 
provide intermediation and loan services as well as payment, liquidity, and safekeeping services 
at the same time. Hence, it can be argued that the latter approach describes the key bank activity 
of deposit-taking in a more complete manner thereby providing a closer representation of reality. 
     We adopt the modified production approach to define inputs and outputs in the estimation of 
MNGEXP1. We specify five variable outputs in total of which traditional banking activities are 
                                                 
7 See Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the two 
approaches.  
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captured by three outputs, namely, total loans (u1) calculated as the sum of commercial, 
construction, industrial, individual and real estate loans; total deposits (u2) which is the sum of 
total transaction deposit accounts, non-transaction savings deposits, and total time deposits; and, 
other earning assets (u3), expressed as the sum of income-earned assets other than loans and the 
net deferred income taxes. Non-traditional banking activities are proxied by two outputs: total 
non-interest income (u4), which is the sum of income from fiduciary activities, service charges 
on deposit accounts, trading fees and income from foreign exchange transactions and from assets 
held in trading accounts augmented by any other non-interest income; and, securitisation activity 
(u5) measured as the value of the outstanding principal balance of loans, leases, and all relevant 
assets securitised and sold to other financial institutions with recourse or other credit 
enhancements divided by total assets.  
     Regarding the inputs we employ in the estimation of MNGEXP1, we consider borrowed 
funds, labour, and physical capital. The price of borrowed funds (v1) is defined as the ratio of 
total interest expense scaled by total deposits and other borrowed money; the price of labour (v2) 
is calculated by dividing total salaries and benefits by the number of full-time employees; and, 
lastly, the price of physical capital (v3), which is equal to the expenses for premises and fixed 
assets divided by the dollar amount of premises and fixed assets. 
 
 
 
 
